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We demonstrate a client-server quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme, with large resources such as
laser and detectors situated at the server-side, which is accessible via telecom-fibre, to a client requiring
only an on-chip polarisation rotator, that may be integrated into a handheld device. The detrimental effects
of unstable fibre birefringence are overcome by employing the reference frame independent QKD protocol
for polarisation qubits in polarisation maintaining fibre, where standard QKD protocols fail, as we show
for comparison. This opens the way for quantum enhanced secure communications between companies
and members of the general public equipped with handheld mobile devices, via telecom-fibre tethering.
The principle of quantum mechanics that requires mi-
croscopic systems to be changed upon observation has per-
plexed physicists since its formulation, yet understanding
that the effect could be harnessed as a resource gave birth
to the field of quantum cryptography [1–13]. Quantum
enhanced security in communication is available through
quantum key distribution (QKD), which exploits the be-
haviour of single photons to allow two parties to exchange
the binary string, or key, that is used in the encryption of
sensitive information. Now implementable with current
technologies [14–16], QKD has matured to the stage where
it is moving from research laboratories towards commer-
cial applications [17]. Here we demonstrate the feasibility
of equipping mobile communication devices with quantum
cryptographic capabilities by making a QKD server acces-
sible over a telecom-fibre, to which a client may tether.
The transmission of quantum information, suitable for
QKD, normally requires that a state sent by Alice is faith-
fully received by Bob, unless an eavesdropper, Eve, ob-
serves the state and reveals her presence as an otherwise
unexplainable disturbance. Yet even in the absence of Eve,
an unstable fibre communication link or instability in the
sending and receiving apparatus, is equivalent to an un-
known or varying reference frame, and has the effect of
unhelpfully transforming the states that Bob receives [18].
Attempts to overcome potential reference frame mis-
alignment by encoding qubits within larger systems [19–
21] require creation, manipulation, and detection of many-
photon entangled states, which is technically challeng-
ing and very loss-sensitive. Encoding information into
the modes available from the transverse spatial profile
of light [22–25], may facilitate communication between
misaligned parties, through air or vacuum, but encoun-
ters problems such as mode dispersion when transmitting
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FIG. 1. Experimental set-up for client-server rfiQKD. The server
side holds a telecom wavelength (1550 nm) laser with a 1 MHz
pulse generator (PG) and fixed polariser, to send light pulses to
the client through a polarisation maintaining fibre (PMF). At the
client side, an integrated polarisation controller (PC) encodes
qubits into the polarisation of the attenuated (Att.) light. A
fibre beam splitter (FBS) and photodetector (PD) continuously
monitor power for malicious attacks. Qubits received back at
the server side are measured with a similar PC, fibre polarising
beamsplitter (FPBS), and superconducting single photon detec-
tors (SSPDs), all controlled by an electronic board synchroni-
sation (Sync.), function programmable gate array (FPGA), and
processor. The Bloch sphere illustrates the effects of an unstable
environment on polarisation.
through fibre. Protocols that exploit the arrival time of pho-
tons as a logical basis necessitate stable interferometers to
perform encoding and decoding, requiring active stabilisa-
tion in fibre [26], or precise temperature regulation in on-
chip QKD with highly asymmetric interferometers [27].
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2An alternative time-multiplexing scheme is the plug and
play system which sends each light pulse back and forth
along the same fibre, with the aid of a Faraday mirror, to
cancel the effects of birefringence [28–32]. Interferomet-
ric stability results form both halves of the time-split pulse
retracing each others path. A drawback to this double-pass
arrangement is the potential for an increased error rate due
to Rayleigh backscattering, which requires the addition of
a storage line to hold a train of pulses which must complete
a round trip before the next train is sent. A further stabil-
ity constraint, related to the length of transmission, is that
fluctuations in the fibre and interferometer should be slow
on the time-scale of the double pass.
The reference frame independent QKD protocol
(rfiQKD) [33–36], deployed here, operates between un-
known and changing reference frames, is independent of
any particular choice of information encoding, requires no
entanglement, and is implementable with two-level sys-
tems encoded onto single photons that may be approxi-
mated with weak coherent laser pulses, making it intrin-
sically practical. The protocol will generate a secret key as
long as the rate of change between reference frames is slow
on the rate of particle repetition.
With freedom to choose the physical two-state encoding
and no requirement for phase stability, the rfiQKD protocol
allowed us to exploit commercially available lithium nio-
bate integrated polarisation controllers [37] to implement
QKD with photon-polarisation qubits over an unstablised
fibre link. Larger resources, such as the photon source and
superconducting detectors [38, 39], are situated on Bob’s
side, which can be regarded as the server side, while Al-
ice, as the client, requires only the capability to perform
single qubit operations. The scenario is one in which the
client tethers a hand held device, with an integrated pho-
tonic chip, to a telecom-fibre to receive dim laser pulses
from the QKD server, which the client attenuates to the sin-
gle photon level, before encoding each pulse with a qubit
of information for return transmission to the server, along
a different fibre.
Here, we demonstrate a stable, constant, and continu-
ously positive secret key rate over the unstablised fibre link
using the rfiQKD protocol, while the rate for the BB84
QKD protocol falls. We go on to show that our rfiQKD
system automatically and passively recovers from the de-
liberate introduction of large amounts of noise in the form
of rapid fluctuations.
Although formulated as an entanglement-driven proto-
col, rfiQKD can be implemented with weak coherent states
that sufficiently approximate single photons, where Al-
ice randomly prepares and sends the polarisation states
{D/A,R/L,H/V } corresponding to the eigenvectors of
the Pauli matrices, which we label as {X,Y, Z} [43]. In
our experiment, the requirement of one known and stable
basis, used to encode the key, is fulfilled with the horizontal
(H) and vertical (V ) polarisation states, that are preserved
throughout transmission in polarisation maintaining fibre
(PMF). The other four states, superpositions of H and V
used to guarantee security, are unhelpfully transformed by
phase fluctuations in PMF due to environmental influences
on the birefringence of the fibre; while this effect is trouble-
some for other protocols, rfiQKD operates in the presence
of phase drifts that are slow on the repetition rate of sent
photons. For fluctuations sufficiently rapid to force pro-
tocol failure, rfiQKD will automatically recover in calmer
periods without the need for re-alignment, as we demon-
strate.
The operation of the protocol, with its phase invari-
ant security measure, works as follows: Expressing Al-
ice and Bob’s measurement bases as ZA = ZB , XB =
cos(β)XA+sin(β)YA and YB = cos(β)YA−sin(β)XA,
where β slowly changes with time in an unknown way,
Alice randomly prepares quantum states which she sends
to Bob, who measures in his randomly chosen basis; later
they publicly reveal their choice of bases. The raw key is
obtained when they both measure in the Z direction, pro-
viding a quantum bit-error rate
Q =
1− 〈ZAZB〉
2
. (1)
The other two slowly rotating bases are used to estimate
the knowledge of a potential Eve. The quantity
C = 〈XAXB〉2 + 〈XAYB〉2
+〈YAXB〉2 + 〈YAYB〉2, (2)
is independent of the relative angle β. If there is no Eve and
the communication channel is ideal with a fixed (although
unknown) phase, then the correlation function 〈ZAZB〉
is equal to 1 whereas 〈XAXB〉, 〈XAYB〉, 〈YAXB〉 and
〈YAYB〉 each take take a constant value between −1 and 1
determined by β. Also, 〈ZAXB〉, 〈ZAYB〉, 〈XAZB〉 and
〈YAZB〉 should be zero as X , Y , and Z are mutually un-
biased. With Z bases aligned, Q = 0 and C = 2 will
be achieved, but in a realistic implementation, Q will be
greater than zero and C will be less than 2.
The correlation functions involved in (1) and (2) are cal-
culated from the rates of photon detections by assigning
positive or negative signs to correlated or anti-correlated
detections respectively. For example, if Bob labels his pair
of detectors as b = {0, 1}, while Alice labels the pair of
states she sends (within a particular basis) as a = {0, 1}
then the 〈AB〉 expectation value is calculated from the
number of detector clicks na b as (n00 + n11 − n01 −
n10)/(n00 + n11 + n01 + n10), which is essentially the
normalised difference of correlated and anti correlated de-
tections.
The security proof of the rfiQKD protocol [33] shows
that when Q . 15.9%, Eve’s information is given by
E(Q,C) =
h
2
(1 + (1−Q)umax + Qv(umax)) (3)
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FIG. 2. Experimental data for secret key rate fraction r showing
robustness to drift. Data is initially collected in the situation of
well aligned client-server reference frames, but the unfixed PMF
quantum channel is subject to ambient environmental influences,
which effect a slowly varying reference frame. While the key rate
for the rfiQKD protocols is constant, for BB84 it suffers a fall as
the alignment drifts. Lower bounds on the secret key rate from
the urfiQKD analysis are shown.
where
umax = min[
√
C/2
1−Q , 1],
v =
1
Q
√
C/2− (1−Q)2u2max,
and the binary entropy
h(x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x).
The secret key rate is given by
r = 1− h(Q)− E(Q,C). (4)
The experimental setup is shown in Fig. 1. At the server
side, light from a 1550 nm continuous-wave laser source
is sent through a pulse generator (PG) to produce pulses of
100 ns width with a repetition rate of 1 MHz [44], which
are filtered by a horizontal polariser and transmitted to the
client through PMF. At the client side, a fibre beam splitter
and photodetector expose hypothetical attacks (for exam-
ple, [40]). A≈ 75 dB attenuator reduces the light intensity
to the single photon level of≈ 0.1 photons per pulse so that
the probability of more than one photon per pulse≈ 0.005.
The client randomly prepares among the six polarisation
states {D,A,R,L,H, V } using a LiNbO3 [41, 42] po-
larisation controller (PC) commanded from a field pro-
grammable gate array (FPGA) and associated driver cir-
cuits. Photonic qubits are returned to the server, along an-
other unstabilised 5 m length of PMF, where a similar PC
and FPGA, together with a fibre polarisation beam split-
ter and superconducting single photon detectors, perform
projective measurements chosen randomly among the three
relevant bases.
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FIG. 3. Experimental data for secret key rate fraction r showing
automatic recovery from rapid noise. During the initial 60s, the
unaligned and slowly varying reference frames result in BB84
failure while the rfiQKD protocols operate. Between t = 60s
and t = 120s we deliberately introduced rapid PMF deforma-
tions force an rfiQKD failure. However, an automatic and pas-
sive revival of r for the rfiQKD protocols is observed during the
subsequent calm period.
All system elements are synchronised to the SYNC-
FPGA platform, which allows for precise timing of all
stages within the transmission period. Each repetition be-
gins with an optical pulse from the server side PG; when
the pulse arrives at the client PC, it is set to prepare a par-
ticular polarisation state; then, timed appropriately for the
return of the pulse, the server PC is set to measure in a par-
ticular basis; finally, the state of the detectors is recorded
by the FPGA.
In addition to demonstrating the feasibility of QKD be-
tween telecom-fibre linked integrated photonic devices in
the described client-server scheme, we aim to show two
features of the rfiQKD protocol that are particularly rel-
evant: robustness to phase drift, inevitable in long range
fibre; and automatic passive recovery from rapid noise.
We also present analysis for the uncalibrated vari-
ant urfiQKD protocol which assumes not only unaligned
reference frames, but also removes the assumption for
alignment within a reference frame, allowing for non-
orthogonality within a basis and mutual bias between
bases, and differing detector efficiencies that arise in a real
world implementation [35]. This is achieved by using an
explicit device model and minimising the key rate over pos-
sible model parameters.
We demonstrated drift robustness of the rfiQKD and
urfiQKD generated key rates in comparison with that of
BB84, beginning key exchange with well aligned client-
server reference frames, so that states prepared by the client
PC had a high fidelity with projectors determined by the
server PC. The PMF quantum channel was unfixed but
undisturbed for the duration of the key exchange, subject
only to ambient environmental influences. Figure. 2 shows
4the secret key rate fraction, r, as a function of time for the
BB84, rfiQKD, and urfiQKD protocols. The duration of
key exchange is 240 s, so each of the 24 points corresponds
to data integrated over 10 seconds, which is long enough to
collect sufficient data to produce small error bars, corre-
sponding to a precision of 3 standard deviations, but short
enough to avoid significant depletion of the value of r,
from integration over largely different values β. For clar-
ity, these error bars are not displayed, instead we show the
lower bound on r from the urfiQKD analysis. It can be seen
that while the secret key rate for BB84 falls as a function
of time, the rfiQKD protocols do not.
We demonstrated the automatic, passive recovery capa-
bility of our system after periods of rapid and substantial
noise that force a protocol failure. Figure. 3 shows r as a
function of time for 24 points, each corresponding to 10
seconds of data, as before. During the initial 60 s of key
exchange, the PMF quantum channel is unfixed and undis-
turbed but unaligned so that the BB84 protocol immedi-
ately fails. However the changes resulting from the ambi-
ent environment are slow enough for the rfiQKD protocols
to operate successfully. Between t = 60 s and t = 120 s
we deliberately introduced a large amount of noise by con-
tinually and significantly deforming the PMF to simulate a
rapidly changing reference frame, forcing r to fall below
zero. At t = 120 s, the noise ceases and as the PMF re-
laxes from the mechanical strains, a positive key rate auto-
matically returns and achieves initial values for the rfiQKD
protocols. In contrast, BB84 achieves a positive r only in
brief transitionary periods of near-alignment. Again, the
lower bound on r for the urfiQKD analysis is displayed.
In conclusion, we demonstrated a client-server QKD
protocol where all large resources reside at server side, and
the client requires only an integrated photonic device that
could be further integrated into a hand held communica-
tion device. The key is exchanged though a PMF telecom-
fibre tether using the rfiQKD protocol, that is shown to
be passively robust to typical environmental drift effects
and can automatically recover from large noise levels to re-
establish QKD in calmer periods with no requirement for
alignment. The results significantly broaden the operating
potential for QKD outside of the laboratory and pave the
way for quantum enhanced security for the general public
with handheld mobile devices.
Future directions are to adapt the system for time multi-
plexing with the rfiQKD protocol which avoids the require-
ment for temperature-stabilised on-chip asymmetric Mach
Zehnder interferometers. Such a system would be well
suited to take advantage of existing (non PMF) telecom-
fibre networks, without the need for double passing and
the inheritance of associated problems. The challenge is
to then increase the distance over which secret key may be
exchanged in telecom-fibre.
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